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TOO SECRET TO SCRUTINISE?  
SELECT COMMITTEES AND EXECUTIVE ACCOUNTABILITY IN 
FOREIGN POLICY  
  
The scrutiny of Executive action in foreign affairs is a constitutional function for 
which the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee is primarily 
responsible. To this end Parliament has, in principle, unlimited inquiry powers. Yet 
our foreign affairs select committee, and those in other Anglo-Commonwealth 
jurisdictions, have in recent years experienced serious and on-going challenges to the 
fulfilment of their investigatory role. The public interest is being pulled in opposite 
directions: the Executive relies on national security considerations to justify 
confidentiality, whereas Parliament can (and should) demand disclosure in order to 
hold the Government accountable. This tension will be explored through examining if 
the recent work of FADT achieves the "robust scrutiny" envisaged by the 1985 select 
committee reforms, followed by a detailed analysis of the validity of one common 
limitation on inquiry powers, statutory secrecy provisions. Possible options for reform, 
namely processes for public interest immunity claims, independent arbitration and 
increased use of secret evidence, will be considered as possible means of 
strengthening the accountability of the Executive for its foreign policy activities. 
Political remedies are unsatisfactory to resolve this tension in the context of 
constitutional obligations and responsibilities.  
  Key words: foreign affairs; inquiry; Parliament; parliamentary privilege; select committees  
 
I Introduction  
Executive accountability to Parliament is at the core of our democracy. The Legislature 
and the Executive fulfil distinct functions; the "Grand Inquest of the Nation"1 and the 
"Defender of the Realm"2. What happens when these roles conflict? Does national 
security limit parliamentary sovereignty, or does that principle require that accountability 
mechanisms are altered rather than avoided?  
Select committees are often described as the "engine rooms"3 of Parliament. These 
committees are tasked with the scrutiny of draft legislation and Executive activity. In 
1985 there were significant changes to the select committee system in New Zealand 
                                                          
1  Neil Laurie "The Grand Inquest of the Nation: A notion of the past?" (2001) 16 Australasian 
Parliamentary Review 173.   
2  Robin Creyke "Executive power – new wine in old bottles?" (2003) 31 FL Rev i at iv; "Memorandum 
of Understanding between the Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime Minister and the Honourable 
Michael Ignatieff, Leader of the Official Opposition and Gilles Duceppe, Leader of the Bloc 
Québécois" (14 May 2010) at [3].   
3  Jonathan Boston and others New Zealand Under MMP: A New Politics? (Auckland University Press, 
Auckland, 1996) at 79.   
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following a review of the Standing Orders.4 Thirteen subject-specific select committees 
were created, mirroring government departments. These committees were given the 
power to initiate their own inquiries.5 The objective of the reform was to increase public 
accountability through systematic scrutiny of Government activities.6 The architect of 
these reforms concluded that parliamentary control has been greatly enhanced as a 
result.7 However that might not be equally true for all select committees. The Foreign 
Affairs, Defence and Trade committee (FADT) is responsible for: customs, defence, 
disarmament and arms control, foreign affairs, trade, and veterans’ affairs.8 There are a 
number of characteristics of its subject matter which may frustrate effective scrutiny.  
FADT is charged with scrutinising areas of Government activity that are often sensitive 
for reasons of national security. The Executive might have good reason for wishing such 
matters remain outside the public forum of a committee evidence hearing. There are 
mechanisms to accommodate these circumstances, namely the ability to hear evidence in 
private or secret9, however these are not often used.10 Security concerns are cited by 
officials to justify non-disclosure, restrictions that appear to have no legal application to 
select committees yet remain largely unchallenged by members. This article explores the 
constitutional implications of this practice.  
The remedies so far advanced to deal with the tension between the Executive and the 
Legislature are political. However political consolations are unsatisfactory given the 
centrality of Executive accountability in our democratic system and the legal nature of 
the issue. The sensitivity of issues under inquiry may require some compromise between 
these two branches of government as to how the competing public interest claims are to 
be balanced. This compromise should not alter the level of scrutiny of the Government, 
rather it concerns how this accountability will be achieved.  Select committees should not 
accept dictation from the Government as to the issues for which it will be held 
accountable. With an increasing amount of Executive activities occurring at an 
                                                          
4  Standing Orders Committee First Report: Part I (July 1985) at 29.  
5  Standing Orders of the House of Representatives 2014, SO 189.  
6  Standing Orders Committee, above n 4, at 4.3.4.  
7  Geoffrey Palmer and Matthew Palmer Bridled Power (4th ed, Oxford University Press, 2004, Oxford)  
at 169. 
8  SO 188.  
9  SO 218 – 219.  
10  Interview with James Picker, Select Committees Operations Manager, Office of the Clerk (the author,  
12 August 2015) final transcript on file with author (Wellington).  
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international level, it is important that these policies are equally subject to scrutiny by 
Parliament.  
To explore the constitutional answers to this question, the article is divided into four 
main parts. First, the powers of the House and function of select committees will be 
briefly described. The activities undertaken by the FADT committee will then be 
outlined, along with a description of the challenges it has faced in holding the Executive 
to account. Obstacles faced in comparable jurisdictions will then be canvassed to 
illustrate why clarification and reform might be an important step in New Zealand. The 
application of statutory secrecy provisions to Parliament will then be discussed in detail, 
in order to understand whether there is a legal basis for the reasons not uncommonly 
cited to FADT to justify non-disclosure. Finally, options for reform will be considered, 
namely: clarification of the guidelines for officials, increased use of secret evidence, 
formalising accepted grounds for non-disclosure, and the possibility for arbitration of 
public interest immunity claims.  
In coming to these conclusions, the reports and supporting evidence of FADT of the 50th 
and 51st Parliament were analysed. A number of interviews were also conducted with 
former and current MPs, including former Deputy Chair of FADT and the current Chair. 
This primary research provided insights into the political and practical context in which 
this important constitutional question is situated. The details of these interviews are 
contained in Appendix 1.  
 
II The powers and functions of the Legislature   
Besides passing legislation, one of the House of Representatives' core functions is to 
scrutinise the Government. In order to fulfil its constitutional role effectively, Parliament 
possesses certain powers, privileges and immunities, together known as "parliamentary 
privilege".11 These include the power to inquire, the power to obtain evidence, and the 
power to punish for contempt.12  
                                                          
11  David McGee Parliamentary Practice in New Zealand (3rd ed, Dunmore Publishing Ltd, Wellington,  
2005) at 605; AV Dicey Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (5th ed, MacMillan  
and Co. Limited, London, 1987) at 357; Malcolm Jack (ed) Erskine May's Treatise on The Law, 
Privileges, Proceedings and Usage of Parliament (24th ed, LexisNexis, London, 2011) at 181.  
12  McGee, at 606.  
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There is no legal definition of contempt of the House.13 The Standing Orders provide 
some examples, which include failing to attend before a committee after being ordered to 
do so14 and hindering a witness from giving evidence to a committee.15 In 2006 the 
House punished a contempt of Parliament through ordering payment of a $1000 fine and 
a formal apology,16 something which had not been done in 103 years.17 This power was 
recently confirmed in legislation but limited to $1000.18 The Parliamentary Privileges 
Act 2014 made clear that this provision in no way limits other powers to punish a 
contempt of the House.19  
The status of these other sanctions is not clear. This is because New Zealand committees 
have not attempted to utilise their full constitutional powers and thus define the existence 
of any boundaries that might circumscribe them.20 The power to seek persons has only 
been invoked once, and only partially. The Justice and Law Reform Committee in June 
1996 required three witnesses to attend and the New Zealand Police issued summonses to 
that effect.21 The witnesses did not in any case appear before the committee and the 
matter was not pursued further.22  
The State Services Commission has produced a document called "Officials and Select 
Committees – Guidelines" (hereafter "Guidelines") which outline how public servants 
should interact with these committees.23 The Guidelines acknowledge that the House 
may require a Minister to produce information and that it is open to the House to punish a 
Minister for continued refusal to supply information.24 It is noted that this would be an 
"extreme step".25 It seems that, in practice, committees are reliant on cooperation.26 
                                                          
13  At 645.  
14  SO 410(s). 
15  SO 410(u). 
16  Privileges Committee Final Report: Question of privilege on the action taken by TVNZ in relation to its  
chief executive, following evidence he gave to the Finance and Expenditure Committee (October 2006) 
at 4. The Privileges Committee found that TVNZ, by penalising an employee exclusively on the basis 
of the employee's evidence to a select committee, had acted contemptuously.  
17  Privileges Committee Interim Report: Question of privilege on the action taken by TVNZ in relation to  
its chief executive, following evidence he gave to the Finance and Expenditure Committee (April 2006) 
at 7.  
18  Parliamentary Privileges Act 2014, s 2.  
19  Section 2(4).  
20  Kirstin Lambert "Limits to Select Committee Investigations – A New Zealand perspective" (2007) 22  
APR 169 at 182.  
21  At 182.  
22  At 181.  
23  Officials and Select Committees – Guidelines (States Services Commission, 10 August 2007)  
['Guidelines'].  
24  At [34]. 
25  At [34]. 
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There are significant ramifications for Executive accountability if the foundation of 
Parliament's scrutiny powers are better characterised as matters of theory. If the powers 
of contempt, which reinforce the legislature's inquiry function, are never invoked, there 
appears to be few consequences for a Government that does not cooperate with an 
inquiry. 
 
A The power to send for persons, papers and records  
A select committee may request relevant papers or that any person give evidence before 
the committee.27 Only the Privileges Committee has the power to send for persons and 
papers; all other committees must apply to the Speaker. A summons will be issued if the 
Speaker is satisfied that the committee has taken all reasonable steps to obtain the 
evidence and that the evidence is necessary for the committee's proceedings.28 If 
Ministers do not attend voluntarily, only the House itself can compel them to do so.29 
There may be limitations to the exercise of the House's power of inquiry which is, in 
principle, unrestricted.30  
As these powers of the Legislature are in practice almost never invoked, the idea that 
they reinforce parliamentary inquiry powers is questionable. It is arguable that the mere 
potential for a sanction to be imposed by the House might encourage voluntary 
compliance, perhaps more so for non-governmental witnesses. Yet for Ministers this 
might be different, as the political reality is that Government members are unlikely to 
vote to punish one of their senior party officials.  
  
B Foreign affairs as a prerogative power  
Parliament has not traditionally had an active role in foreign affairs. As external relations 
are conducted under the prerogative power, there is no equivalent of the parliamentary 
scrutiny which occurs before a statutory power is created under legislation. Moreover, 
unlike the framework provided by statute, there are no such constraints laid down in 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
26  Lambert, at 181.  
27  SO 196.  
28  SO 197(2).  
29  Guidelines, at [52]. 
30  McGee, above n 11, at 434.  
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writing from which to then judge the use of prerogative power.31  In foreign affairs, 
Parliament holds the Government to account after decisions have already been made. 
Further, the courts tend to distance themselves from ruling on foreign policy matters. Yet 
this deference is based on the premise that there is an existing accountability mechanism 
for foreign policy performed by Parliament.32 FADT's subject matter primarily concerns 
areas conducted via prerogative power. Because the committee has a lighter legislative 
workload, FADT committee has a greater role in holding the Executive to account 
through inquiries.  However inquiring into the prerogative can present distinct 
challenges.  
It must be noted that over the past decade the New Zealand Parliament has developed a 
more active role in foreign affairs through examination of international treaties prior to 
ratification.33 This now forms a significant part of the workload of the FADT committee. 
Entering into treaties is only one foreign policy activity of the Executive. The 
examination process itself can be criticised for occurring only once the treaty text has 
been finalised, raising questions as to the depth of scrutiny achieved. Formulating policy 
and setting priorities, opening Embassies, distributing overseas development assistance, 
campaigning for a non-permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, deploying 
troops – all of these activities occur outside the legislative and treaty framework, with no 
consent required from Parliament. Inquiries form an important, and perhaps overlooked, 
part of the Legislature's constitutional role in holding the Government to account, 
especially in context of FADT.  
 
C Select committee inquiries  
The work of committees is meant to be more effective than debate in the House, by virtue 
of the expertise of committee members and the capacity to conduct longer, more detailed 
inquiries.34 Inquiries form a more important role in FADT's scrutiny function given the 
nature of foreign affairs. One of the strengths of committees is the ability to compile a 
                                                          
31  Campbell McLachlan Foreign Relations Law (Cambridge University Press, October 2014) at 153.  
32  At 189; AV Dicey, above n 11, at 393.  
33  SO 2014 397 – 400.   
34  McLachlan, above n 31, at 182.  
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body of diverse information.35 Public questioning of senior officials and ministers is an 
integral part of the committee's role, as such detailed public accountability does not take 
place elsewhere.36 It is important that select committees are able to perform their inquiry 
functions, as they are the superior mechanism of doing so.    
The ability of the Executive to refuse requests for information could stifle inquiries 
potentially embarrassing for the Government. It is precisely these areas of Government 
activity which are in most need of scrutiny. An inquiry might expose systemic issues or 
investigate a particular event, and could result in a change of Government policy. This 
will only be the case, however, if the possibility of a select committee inquiry, with the 
requirement to provide evidence when requested, presented a powerful and real demand 
from the Legislature to the Executive.  
 
III Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee  
In the 50th Parliament, FADT considered three bills, received 21 briefings, examined 23 
treaties, considered 8 petitions, and initiated one inquiry.37 It also complete five annual 
reviews and five estimates each year. At the time of writing, the committee of the 51st 
Parliament has considered two bills, had 13 briefings, examined 5 treaties, considered 
two petitions, and has also conducted one set of five annual reviews and five estimates. 
Briefings are information-gathering exercises for the committee. If an incident happens 
overseas, the members may want to educate themselves from a source other than the 
news media. They are often one-off briefings, however the current committee has two 
standing items of business: briefings on the United Nations Security Council and 
disarmament. FADT members are able to educate themselves about the committee's 
subject areas and thus better scrutinise Government policy. Briefings are part of the 
inquiry function of a committee. A full inquiry can involve a large number of briefings 
from different stakeholders. It is important for the committee to form an assessment of 
the situation independent of the information provided by the Executive. An inquiry can 
                                                          
35  Meghan Benton and Meg Russell "Assessing the Impact of Parliamentary Oversight Committees: The  
Select Committees in the British House of Commons" (2013) 66 Parliamentary Affairs 772 at 789. 
36  House of Commons Liaison Select Committee Select committee effectiveness, resources and powers:  
Written evidence from the International Development Committee (7 November 2012) at [9]. 
37  Interview with John Thomson, Clerk of the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee (the  
author, 14 August 2015) final transcript on file with author (Wellington). 
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be into the formulation and implementation of Government policy or into the facts of a 
particular incident. These inquiries are different in nature and this distinction has some 
important constitutional implications.  
While FADT might have a smaller number of bills referred to it given the nature of its 
subject area, this may be compensated by its unique treaty examination function.  
Treaties are referred in the first instance to FADT.38 The committee is to retain the treaty 
for examination if it falls primarily within its own subject-matter. In the 50th Parliament, 
FADT retained all but one treaty.39  
Annual reviews relate to the performance in the previous financial year and the current 
operations of each department.40 Select committees send upwards of one hundred written 
questions to the ministries under review, which are responded to by those ministries and 
provided as evidence to the committee. Estimates relate to the appropriations for the 
upcoming financial year. It is through these two processes that the most comprehensive 
scrutiny occurs. However, as detailed below, the annual opportunity to examine 
Executive conduct within the subject area of FADT is hindered by non-disclosure of 
information.  
There is no expectation that Ministers attend select committees outside of the one hour 
hearing during Estimates.41 Unless accorded secrecy or privacy, the hearing of evidence 
is a proceeding open to the public.42 Ministers can and do attend select committees at 
other points during the year, and Minister of Trade did brief FADT a number of times in 
the 50th Parliament, however it is still a rare occurrence. The written questions to the 
department and the short time available to directly question the Minister must be 
effectively used to secure accountability in this annual opportunity for the systematic 
scrutiny, which was the objective of the 1985 reforms.   
In the Estimates conducted in 2015, the Minister of Foreign Affairs declined to provide a 
copy of legal advice, claiming legal professional privilege. The advice related to the 
multimillion dollar payment to establish a demonstration sheep farm in Saudi Arabia. 
                                                          
38  SO 399.  
39  Interview with John Thompson.  
40  SO 344(1).  
41  Interview with Dr Kennedy Graham, Member of FADT (the author, 10 August 2015); Interview with  
Hon Trevor Mallard, Assistant Speaker of the House of Representatives (the author, 19 August 2015); 
Interview with Mark Mitchell, Chair of FADT (the author, 30 July 2015) – final transcripts on file with 
author (Wellington).  
42  SO 222(1).  
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The Prime Minister declined to comment in detail on the issue in the House as the matter 
"will bear the scrutiny of the Auditor-General".43 The Greens Co-Leader called for the 
resignation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, but he did not call for an investigation by 
FADT, instead stating that the "confusion and contradiction" surrounding the issue 
highlighted the need for an investigation by the Auditor-General.44 This indicates that 
FADT may not be seen as the most appropriate scrutiny mechanism for foreign policy, 
although the payment seems to fall squarely within the committee's terms of reference.  
The evidence provided by the various government departments in response to FADT's 
written questions during the previous and current Parliaments are replete with indications 
of the practical limitations on this committee's investigatory powers. As recently as this 
year the Chief of the Defence force was not prepared to provide the logistical details of 
the New Zealand personnel deployed to Iraq.45  
The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade also declined to comment on the issue of a 
waiver of the diplomatic immunity of the Malaysian Defence Attaché because it was sub 
judice.46 While matters sub judice are listed as possibly justifying hearing the evidence in 
secret,47 officials are expected to be as helpful as possible in responding to committee 
requests.48 The Ministry should have applied to give the particular evidence in secret 
rather than simply decline the request.49  
In response to the committee's request for a copy of the Crown Law opinion on the 
release of the Whitehead Report50, the Ministry wrote they could not release it to the 
committee because it was legally privileged.51 Moreover, the Ministry informed the 
FADT committee that the advice provided to the Minister regarding the deployment of 
personnel to Iraq was subject to legal professional privilege.52 Maintaining both the 
confidentiality of advice from officials and legal professional privilege can constitute 
                                                          
43  (19 August 2015) 707 NZPD at 1.  
44  (19 August 2015) 707 NZPD at 14.  
45  Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee 2013/14 Annual review of the Ministry of Defence and  
the New Zealand Defence Force (8 April 2015) at 5.  
46  Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee 2013/14 Annual Review of the Ministry of Foreign  
Affairs and Trade (8 April 2015) at 5.  
47  Guidelines, above n 23, at [37].  
48  Guidelines, above n 23, at [31].  
49  SO 220.  
50  Ministerial inquiry by John Whitehead into the events surrounding the request for waiver of the  
diplomatic immunity of a Malaysian Defence Attaché.  
51  Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade " FADTC: Vote FAT Financial Review 2013/14 – Additional  
Questions" at question 300. 
52  At question 303. 
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good reasons for withholding information under the Official Information Act 1982.53 
Even if this Act did apply to select committees, non-disclosure is only justified if not 
outweighed by other considerations which render disclosure desirable and in the public 
interest.54 There is great public interest in committees being able to effectively scrutinise 
Government decisions in their subject areas. Disclosure of legal advice underlying a 
foreign policy decision would serve the public interest in upholding accountability. Any 
harm to the public interest that could result from disclosure could be minimised through 
receiving the evidence in private or in secret.  
In response to a written question regarding risk assessment of deployment of personnel to 
Iraq, the New Zealand Defence Force stated that to protect those personnel such 
information was not disclosed.55 Further, in regard to New Zealand frigates boarding 
suspected pirate vessels in the Gulf of Aden, the same justification for non-disclosure 
was made: disclosure of NZDF rules of engagement would compromise operational 
security.56 In response to a question for detailed information regarding external 
contractors, NZDF outlined the individual firm engagements but did not disclose the 
maximum hourly and daily rates charged, as that would "unreasonably prejudice the 
commercial position" of such firms.57 This was stated to be in accordance with accepted 
practice.58 When the committee asked what specific recommendations were made in the 
Court of Inquiry into the suicide of Corporal Doug Hughes in Afghanistan in 2012, 
certain provisions in the Coroners Act 2006 and the Armed Forces Discipline Act 1971 
were relied on to justify non-disclosure.59 NZDF did not answer how many Official 
Information requests required clearance for prior to release.60 The committee has also 
received copies of the briefing to the incoming Minister with sections blanked out under 
the Official Information Act and "commercial sensitivity" has been used to justify non-
disclosure.61  
                                                          
53  Respectively, Official Information Act 1982, s 9(f)(iv) and s 9(h).  
54  Section s9(1).  
55  New Zealand Defence Force "Evidence provided to the Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Committee  
2013/2014 Financial Review – Vote: Defence Force (questions 2.131 – 2.165)" at 2.139. 
56  At 2.153.  
57  New Zealand Defence Force "2012/13 financial review of the New Zealand Defence Force – Response  
to questions 1 - 267 (Complete set)" at 1.18. 
58  Interview with James Picker, above n 10.  
59  New Zealand Defence Force, above n 57, at 1.210; Coroners Act 2006, s 71; Armed Forces Discipline  
Act 1971, s 200T(a).  
60  New Zealand Defence Force, at 1.68.  
61  Interview with John Thomson, above n 37.  
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Lastly, in 2014 the Chief of the NZDF responded negatively to the committee's request 
for a briefing on the situation in Afghanistan, as the situation was too sensitive.62 While 
such outright refusals to briefing requests are rare, it can be described as the most 
extreme version of a trend of Executive self-restraint.63 A qualitative, rather than 
quantitative, approach is more appropriate in this context. The routine provision of non-
sensitive information to select committees does not demonstrate the full accountability of 
the Executive. It is how a system responds in a crisis that is important.64 
A committee can decide to follow up a refusal and could choose to request a summons 
from the Speaker, but that has never happened in FADT. There is an understanding that 
the Opposition will be in Government one day, thus "do unto others as you would have 
them do unto you".65 It is always open to include adverse comments regarding the lack of 
cooperation in the committee's report to Parliament. This is a political consequence for 
which the Minister is accountable. The committee may expose the issue this way rather 
than through the select committee process itself; this is where the accountability lies.66 
The truth will surface in time; accountability might come later after sensitivity of the 
issue has passed.67 
If adverse comments represent the highpoint of Executive accountability in foreign 
policy, this demonstrates the weakness of the scrutiny. First, select committee reports are 
rarely debated in the House. The practice is for the reports to sit on the Order Paper for 
fifteen sitting days, after which they are considered dealt with.68 The Estimates for the 
departments in FADT's subject area are debated for approximately one hour during the 
Budget debate as the “External Sector”. Secondly, adverse comments are likely to be 
included in the minority view of a report, which is not guaranteed to be included in the 
final report. While not common practice, minority views have been blocked from the 
official reports of FADT.69 Thirdly, the making of adverse comments is a political 
consequence. This may result in a question to the Minister in the House and some 
                                                          
62  Interview with Dr Kennedy Graham, above n 41; Interview with John Thomson.  
63  Interview with Dr Kennedy Graham.  
Interview with Sir Geoffrey Palmer, Former Prime Minister of New Zealand, (the author, 4 August 
2015) final transcript on file with author (Wellington). 
65  Interview with Dr Kennedy; Interview with James Picker; Interview with Hon Trevor Mallard, above n  
41.  
66  Interview with James Picker.  
67  Interview with Hon Trevor Mallard.  
68  SO 74(4).   
69  Interview with Keith Locke, former FADT member, (the author, 16 August 2015) final transcript on  
file with author (Wellington).  
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attention in the media. In these contexts the Executive is more likely, and more entitled, 
to use justifications for non-disclosure such as national security or pure political 
deflection. In the end, even if there is a short period of uncomfortable attention on the 
Government, the information with which the committee was concerned remains secret. 
Thus, at best, there can be some shallow scrutiny for non-disclosure of information if the 
matter is brought to the attention of the House or the media, yet the robust scrutiny 
envisaged by the 1985 reforms remains unrealised.  
The only way to receive highly sensitive information is in secret, yet that mechanism 
does not appear to be used often. There is a high threshold for secrecy: it must be shown 
that there is no other way to get the information and it is a matter of leave, so all 
members must agree.70 The Office of the Clerk advises against it in part because the 
security concerns it raises.71 Yet it is said to be one of the powers that facilitates very 
deep scrutiny.72 In the 50th Parliament and so far in the 51st Parliament, private and secret 
evidence have been received collectively seven times by FADT.73 The greater use of 
private and secret evidence would cut across the objective of direct public engagement. 
However it might be the mechanism which allows Parliament to accommodate the 
Executive's role as "Defender of the Realm" instead of abandoning its scrutiny role. As 
the following examples will show, full public disclosure might not be in the public 
interest.  
 
IV Challenges faced in Comparable Jurisdictions 
Recent experiences in Australia, the United Kingdom and Canada illustrate two particular 
challenges which limit these committees' investigatory powers: access to official 
documents and the ability of committees to summon ministers, or their staff, to give 
evidence.74 Due to similar constitutional arrangements, such a discussion allows insights 
into the potential weaknesses of our own accountability mechanisms.  
 
                                                          
70  SO 219.  
71  Interview with James Picker, above n 10. 
72  Interview with James Picker.  
73  Interview with John Thomson, above n 37. 
74  McLachlan, above n 31, at 185  
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A United Kingdom  
The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons conducted an inquiry into the 
Government's decision to go to war in Iraq in July 2003.75 The committee faced a distinct 
lack of cooperation from the Government. Officials did not to attend76 and the committee 
was refused access to intelligence assessments, precluding the committee from judging 
the veracity of Government claims.77  
The Government responses were unsatisfactory in view of the constitutional function of 
select committees. When asked to provide information demonstrably relevant to the 
inquiry, the Government response was that it will consider how to appropriately brief the 
committee when intelligence is requested.78 The Government stated that allowing access 
to intelligence as part of a committee inquiry would establish "competing jurisdictions".79 
However the creation of the Intelligence and Security Committee was not intended to 
limit the existing responsibilities of select committees.80 This is relevant to New Zealand 
given the similar structure of our statutory Intelligence and Security Committee.81 It is 
not constitutionally sound that the Government itself decides what amount of information 
is "appropriate" in order for it to be held accountable. It should be the select committee 
who judges whether they know enough to scrutinise the Executive.   
The issues raised in 2003 were the focus of a more general inquiry into select committee 
effectiveness by the Liaison Committee in 2012.82 The Defence Committee and the 
International Development Committee gave evidence of similar challenges. The Defence 
Committee noted how its work had been obstructed by the Department's continued 
unwillingness to provide estimated costs of military operations.83 Similarly, the 
International Development Committee stated that they were disappointed with the 
                                                          
75  House of Commons Foreign Affairs Committee The Decision to go to War in Iraq (7 July 2003).   
76            At [6].   
77  At [27].  
78  Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Response to the Ninth Report of the Foreign  
Affairs Committee The Decision to go to War in Iraq (November 2003) at 7.  
79  At 7.  
80  House of Commons Foreign Affairs, at [160].  
81  See Intelligence and Security Act 1996, s 5-6.  
82  House of Commons Liaison Select Committee Select committee effectiveness, resources and powers (8  
November 2012). 
83  House of Commons Liaison Select Committee Select committee effectiveness, resources and powers:  
Written evidence from the Defence Committee (7 November 2012) at 1.  
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Department’s refusal to provide certain documents, which had impeded their work.84 
Interestingly, the Foreign Affairs Committee did not raise issues around seeking 
information.85 However, the continued executive-imposed limitations on these 
committees' investigatory powers indicates that the issue is more systemic in nature.  
 
B Australia 
The accountability relationship between the Executive and Legislature in the foreign 
affairs context has been challenged in a jurisdiction closer to home. A Senate Committee 
inquired into false allegations that children had been thrown from boats carrying asylum 
seekers in Australian waters. The report concluded that there was an accountability 
vacuum within ministers' officers, with ministerial advisers appearing to possess their 
own executive authority.86 During this inquiry there was a Cabinet decision prohibiting 
the attendance of the ministerial staff in question.87 The committee decided not to 
summon the staff as their non-attendance was due to the instruction of their Minister.88 
The report concluded that Government involvement with the inquiry had "been 
characterised by minimal cooperation and occasionally outright resistance… "89 
Further, in a 2009 inquiry, the Australian Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade References 
Committee faced challenges in obtaining the necessary information from the Ministry of 
Defence. The inquiry concerned the removal of two sailors from a naval ship and 
subsequent naval investigation. The committee was at pains to highlight the distinction 
between the character of their inquiry, where the objective was to ascertain what had 
happened in this particular workplace, and the nature of an inquiry into Government 
implementation of policy.90 The committee inquiry was into the conduct of specific 
individuals. It was thus inappropriate for the Government to approve submissions before 
                                                          
84  House of Commons Liaison Select Committee, above n 36, at [13] – [14].  
85  House of Commons Liaison Select Committee Select committee effectiveness, resources and powers:  
Written evidence from the Foreign Affairs Committee (7 November 2012).  
86  Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident (Australia) Inquiry into a Certain Maritime  
Incident (23 October 2003) at 33.  
87  At 34.  
88  Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, above n 86, at 35.  
89  At 37.  
90  Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (Australia) Report on  
parliamentary privilege: Inquiry into matters relating to events on HMAS Success (18 March 2010) at  
3.  
16 
 
they were sent to the committee or to deter staff from appearing as witnesses.91 The 
committee considered the guidelines for officials witnesses, which state that approval of 
submissions will generally, but not always, be required.92 The potential dissuasion of 
witnesses was noted in the committee's report as a possible contempt of the Senate.93 The 
New Zealand guidelines for officials lack any such distinction, a concerning omission 
which will be returned to in the latter part of this article.  
 
C Canada  
The tension placed on the accountability relationship in the foreign affairs context was 
also brought to the forefront in a ruling of the Speaker of the Canadian House of 
Commons in April 2010. He ruled that there had been a prima facie breach of privilege in 
denying the Special Committee on the Canadian Mission in Afghanistan access to 
documents relating to the treatment of Afghan detainees by Canadian personnel. The 
objective of the inquiry was to determine if those personnel were aware of the risk of 
mistreatment.94 In 2011 a FADT member called for a select committee inquiry into the 
same issue as it related to NZDF.95 This was not actioned due to lack of support.96  
In Canada, the majority of officials refused to provide the necessary information to the 
committee. The option to hear evidence in private did not alter the position of the 
officials.97 Documents were denied on the basis of the priority of solicitor-client privilege 
and also by virtue of the Canada Evidence Act 1985.98 When the House of Commons 
ordered the production of documents, the Government tabled thousands of heavily 
redacted documents.   
                                                          
91  At 3. 
92  At 4; See also Government Guidelines for Official Witnesses before Parliamentary Committees and  
Related Matters (Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet, February 2015) (Australia) at 1.5.3.  
93  Senate Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade (Australia), above n 90, at 4.  
94  Heather MacIvor "The Speaker’s Ruling on Afghan Detainee Documents: The Last Hurrah for  
Parliamentary Privilege?" (2010) 19 Constitutional Forum 129 at 130.  
95  Interview with Keith Locke, above n 69; "Locke to push for Select Committee Inquiry on SAS" (1 May  
2011)  
Green Party of Aotearoa New Zealand <https://home.greens.org.nz/press-releases/locke-push-select-
committee-inquiry-sas>. 
96  Interview with Keith Locke.  
97  MacIvor, above n 94, at 130.  
98  At 130; see also Canada Evidence Act RSC 1985 c. C-5, s 38; analogous to section 6(a) of the New  
Zealand Official Information Act.   
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The Speaker ruled that the production of documents by the House was more than an 
indisputable privilege, it was also an obligation.99 The production of papers is a "broad, 
absolute power that on the surface appears to be without restriction".100 The existence of 
sufficient grounds to justify non-disclosure was ultimately a decision for the House.101 
He gave the parties themselves the responsibility to reach a compromise within two 
weeks of his ruling. 
The Government, while negotiating with the Opposition parties, insisted on its ability to 
withhold documents based on Cabinet confidentiality and solicitor-client privilege.102 
This was accepted by two of the Opposition parties and the accord was accepted by the 
Speaker. An ad hoc committee of parliamentarians was established and given access to 
all the relevant information. 103 If the committee decided the information was necessary 
to the inquiry, the information in question was referred to the Panel of Arbiters, 
composed of three "eminent jurists". 104 The Panel would determine how to disclose the 
necessary information without compromising national security. It was to be guided by the 
principle of maximum disclosure conditioned by the exceptions required by the 
Government.105 This result does not reflect the absolute powers of the House to request 
documents referred to in the Speaker's ruling. After one year of work, 4,000 less-
censored documents were released to the House of Commons.106This left an estimated 
36,000 documents that will not be publically released.107  
Whether or not there are established restrictions to the House's inquiry powers is an 
unsettled question in New Zealand. The next section will explore whether secrecy 
provisions apply to Parliament so as to limit the scope of information that committees 
may request. The difference between committees' technical powers and actual powers 
may have serious implications for Executive accountability.  
                                                          
99  (27 April 2010) 034 CPD HC 1520.  
100  At 1525, quoting Robert Marleau and Camille Montpetit (eds) House of Commons Procedure and  
Practice (2nd ed, Chenelière McGraw-Hill, Montreal, 2000) at 978-979.  
101  At 1525.  
102  At 134; "Memorandum of Understanding between the Right Honourable Stephen Harper, Prime  
Minister and the Honourable Michael Ignatieff, Leader of the Official Opposition and Gilles Duceppe, 
Leader of the Bloc Québécois" (14 May 2010) at [7].  
103  At [1].  
104  "Memorandum of Understanding", at [6] and [8].  
105  At [7].  
106  Laura Payton "Afghan detainee records still hold questions, MPs say" (22 June 2011) CBC News  
<http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/afghan-detainee-records-still-hold-questions-mps-say-1.980794>.  
107  Laura Payton.  
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V Statutory Secrecy Provisions 
The passing of the Official Information Act 1982 signalled a shift towards more open 
government. The Act's guiding principle of availability is, however, tempered by a 
significant qualification: information will be withheld if there is a good reason for doing 
so. There are a number of conclusive reasons for withholding official information which 
relate to FADT's field of inquiry. For example, information can be justifiably withheld if 
its disclosure would be likely to prejudice the country's security or international 
relations.108 There are other secrecy provisions in New Zealand legislation that only 
provide for disclosure in very limited circumstances.109 The important question is 
whether statutory secrecy provisions apply to the House so as to limit select committee 
inquiry powers. In practice, there seem to be real restrictions to the information the 
committee can access, as evidenced by the written answers in FADT's annual reviews. 
This question is particularly pertinent to FADT, not only because the issues under inquiry 
tend to be sensitive, but also because the Executive can have an effective monopoly over 
the provision of defence or foreign affairs-related information.110. Thus a refusal to 
disclose requested information is a very significant barrier to scrutiny.  
The State Services Commission Guidelines have no formal status and have not been 
accepted by Parliament. These Guidelines acknowledge that the Official Information Act 
"does not formally constrain the powers of the House" yet information should be released 
to committees in accordance with the principles of the Act.111 The Guidelines state that 
certain statutes may contain restrictions on the disclosure of information.112 The 
ambiguous advice contained in these Guidelines reflects, or at least creates the perception 
of, an uncertain legal position of secrecy provisions in relation to select committees.  
The effect of statutory secrecy provisions has previously been raised by FADT.113 In 
1994 the committee requested a copy of a Serious Fraud Office (SFO) report into a 
military court of inquiry. The committee was informed that the Serious Fraud Office Act 
1990 prevented the report being released to them.114 Following meetings with the SFO 
                                                          
108  Official Information Act, s 6(a).  
109  For example: Tax Administration Act 1994, s 81.  
110  Benton and Russell, above n 35, at 790.  
111  Guidelines, above n 23, at [13].   
112  At [30].  
113  Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee Financial Procedures at RNZAF Ohakea  
(1994).  
114  At [3].  
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Deputy Director, the committee later received the report with certain personal details 
deleted, with an acknowledgement that the power of the committee to request papers was 
not limited by the Act.115 However this incident might raise more questions than answers 
as to the application of secrecy provisions to select committees.  
While warning all public sector organisations that they could be scrutinised by the 
House,116 the committee's comments also indicated a willingness to accept that secrecy 
provisions may in some instances justifiably preclude the disclosure of information. They 
wrote that the public interest would sometimes be served better through non-disclosure, 
particularly in cases where personal reputations or commercial operations were at risk.117 
This does not seem to fully account for the possibility of secret evidence. The committee 
noted that it did not want its push for the disclosure of the report to be "…interpreted as 
an automatic precedent for a 'backdoor' means of gaining access to and publicising 
information otherwise protected by statute..."118 Information subject to a secrecy 
provision was not seen as information that the committee was entitled to as a matter of 
parliamentary privilege.  
This case study may be of limited use given the nature of the discretion given to the SFO 
Director under the Act. The relevant section provides that the Director may release 
information to any person who the Director is satisfied has a proper interest in receiving 
such information.119 Thus the request from the FADT committee cannot be characterised 
as the direct prioritisation of parliamentary privilege over statutory secrecy provisions. 
Rather, it was a public servant exercising discretion under the governing legislation.120  
Five years later, the secrecy provisions of the Tax Administration Act 1994 were said to 
limit the Finance and Expenditure Committee's inquiry into the Inland Revenue 
Department.121 The Solicitor-General advised the committee that select committee 
inquiries did not constitute an exception to the officials' obligation to maintain 
confidentiality.122 The committee concluded that it must obey the law and somehow 
                                                          
115  At [3]. 
116  At [4].  
117  At [4]. 
118  Foreign Affairs, Defence and Trade Select Committee, above n 113, at 4. 
119  Serious Fraud Office Act 1990, s 36(2)(e).  
120  Peter McHugh and Russell Keith "Statutory Secrecy Provisions" (seminar presented to Australian and  
New Zealand Association of Clerks-at-the-Table, Wellington, January 2005) at 5.  
121  Lambert, above n 20, at 179.  
122  At 179.  
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reconcile its request for information with any applicable secrecy provisions.123 Yet the 
committee added, ambiguously, that while not "strictly bound by the law" there was an 
obligation to take statutory secrecy provisions into account.124 This position may be 
justified in that committees are part of the Legislature which made this policy decision, 
and thus may feel bound to guide their activities accordingly, even if not strictly required 
to. For example, the Privileges Committee noted that Parliament could be brought into 
disrepute if select committees encouraged witnesses to disclose information where there 
were more appropriate processes that could be used.125  
These two examples relate to information about specific individuals rather than material 
informing Government foreign policy. Perhaps there is more justification for committees 
exercising restraint when it comes to personal information and the protection of privacy. 
Arguably Parliament is not the best mechanism for scrutiny of such issues, where there 
are superior institutions to look into individual claims, such as the judiciary. The same 
justification could not be made for information concerning the deployment of troops, for 
example. Parliament can and must look into more systemic issues and policies and 
decisions of Ministers.  
There does not appear to be a conclusive answer as to the application of secrecy 
provisions to select committees. The Standing Orders Committee in 1995126, despite 
receiving expert evidence on the question127, did not include the topic in their final 
report. In his evidence, Phillip Joseph stated that the search for a single answer will be 
inconclusive, as the character and wording of the provisions, and thus their effect, are 
varied.128 However as parliamentary privilege is part of the general law of New Zealand, 
privilege can be modified by statute. An example this is the New Zealand Bill of Rights 
Act, which applies to the House.129  
Thus a secrecy provision that explicitly stated that it bound the House would limit 
Parliament's access to the information protected by the provision. In such a case it would 
                                                          
123  Finance and Expenditure Select Committee Inquiry into the powers and operations of the Inland  
Revenue Department (October 1999) at 10.  
124  Lambert, at 179.  
125  For example the Protected Disclosures Act 2000; Privileges Committee, above n 16, at 6.  
126  Standing Orders Committee Report of the Standing Orders Committee on the review of ' standing 
orders (1995).  
127   Philip Joseph, Part 3a Report of the Standing Orders Committee on the review of standing  
orders Appendices (1995) at 237.  
128  McGee, above n 11, at 435. 
129  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 3(a).  
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be unlawful for the House to use its coercive powers to try to obtain the information, 
despite the general power to inquire.130 However, secrecy provisions do not generally 
contain reference to parliamentary inquiries. When read in light of the constitutional role 
of the House, it seems unlikely that secrecy provisions would limit the powers of the 
House by implication.131  
 
In Canada, parliamentary privilege may only be abrogated by express words.132 In 
Australia, an "express statutory declaration" is  required.133 However something less than 
express words may be sufficient in New Zealand.134 The statutory interpretation principle 
of necessary implication applies to parliamentary privilege.135 The constitutional 
significance of such an implication may however require a higher threshold.136 It must be 
clear that Parliament intended to limit its own powers. The legislation which in practice 
is used to justify non-disclosure does not expressly or by necessary implication apply to 
select committees. While it is possible that the inquiry powers of committees could be 
legally circumscribed in the future, the current practice does not appear to have a legal 
basis. Great clarity regarding the application of statutory secrecy provisions is one way to 
reinforce the inquiry powers of select committees.  
 
IV  Possible reform in the New Zealand context  
The experiences of our own Parliament and that of comparable jurisdictions have shown 
that there are inevitable tensions between the Executive's claim to confidentiality and the 
Legislature's right to know. Public interest is being pulled simultaneously in opposite 
directions. If, in practice, there are accepted grounds the Government can claim to justify 
non-disclosure, should these limitations be acknowledged in some way? Moreover, if the 
Legislature and Executive disagree whether disclosure is in the public interest, should 
                                                          
130  McGee, at 435.  
131  At 436.  
132  Re House of Commons and Canada Labour Relations Board (1986) 27 DLR (4th) 481 at 490  
(per Pratte J); Harvey v New Brunswick (Attorney-General) (1996) 137 DLR (4th) 142 at [70] (per 
McLachlin J) as per footnote 25 in McGee at 610.  
133  Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee Determination of Public Interest  
Immunity Claims Appendix 4: Evidence from the Clerk of the Senate (7 January 2014), second 
attachment at 5.  
134  McGee, at 610.  
135  Peter McHugh and Russell Keith, above n 120, at 3.  
136  At 4.   
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there be an independent arbitration process to resolve the dispute?  In addition to these 
two questions, reform of the guidance to officials must also be considered in order to 
bring the advice in line with constitutional principles.  
 
A Justifiable grounds for non-disclosure  
Currently in New Zealand there appears to be no clear grounds on which the Executive 
can legally withhold information requested by the House. There are no statutory secrecy 
provisions which apply expressly to Parliament, yet FADT has accepted those limitations 
on their inquiry powers. A refusal in response to a request from a select committee like 
FADT is different to a refusal to an order of the House. Only the latter may be found to 
be a contempt of Parliament.  
The reason why committees are reluctant to press for information and request summons 
is unclear. Perhaps Government members are motivated by political considerations, 
accepting whatever information is given in order not to embarrass the Executive and 
disrupt their own career progression. Perhaps Government departments and select 
committees members do not understand what they are, respectively, constitutionally 
obliged to disclose or entitled to receive. Or perhaps Parliament has grown to 
accommodate the Executive in its pursuit of foreign policy and agrees that Government 
claims of national security exclude certain activities from scrutiny. However it does seem 
that receiving evidence in secret is seen as a solution to the impasse given its infrequent 
use. A model based of the 2009 Australian Senate process described below might be 
useful in clarifying what, if any, limits to scrutiny powers may be accepted by the House 
in accommodating the distinct tasks of Government and Parliament.    
The Australian Senate137 set out a process for the Executive to claim public interest 
immunity. This Order consolidated existing practice. In 1975 the Commonwealth Senate 
had resolved the power for the Senate to summon documents was "subject to the 
determination of all just and proper claims of privilege".138 Rather than a limitation on 
the Legislature's power, the Order represents an acknowledgement that some information 
                                                          
137  Order of the Commonwealth Senate (Australia) J.1941-2 (13 May 2009).  
138  Resolution of the Commonwealth Senate (Australia) J.831 (16 July 1975).  
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should not be disclosed, signalling that such claims will at least be entertained.139 The 
responsible Minister must provide the committee with the ground justifying non-
disclosure, specifying the harm to the public interest which could result.140 If the 
committee finds this unsatisfactory, it can report the matter to the Senate, which may 
order the production of the documents.141 The Senate makes the ultimate decision 
regarding disclosure. The Order itself does not list what may justify non-disclosure. 
There are, however, a number of accepted grounds outlined in the Australian guidelines, 
including national security.142  
In New Zealand there is limited guidance of what may justify non-disclosure. 
Committees have accepted limitations from time to time, but this is not the same as a 
consistent and clear resolution from the Legislature. The Guidelines state that "legitimate 
concerns" should be communicated to the committee which may agree to receive the 
information in a different form. 143 There is no explanation of what may constitute a 
"legitimate concern", and who is to be the judge of the claim’s legitimacy. Each 
committee much approach non-disclosure on a case by case basis144, uncertain as to 
whether the committee is legally entitled to the information.  
A statement from Parliament similar to that of the 1975 resolution of the Australian 
Senate would be useful in clarifying each parties' rights and obligations. It would 
acknowledge and formalise a practice that already seems to occur in FADT. It would 
force Ministers to articulate the reasons for their refusals and limit the reasons that could 
be relied upon. Ministers would need to outline the harm to the public interest that would 
follow disclosure,  making it more difficult to withhold information for purely political 
reasons. At the very least, this process could make the issue of Executive compliance 
with select committee requests more transparent to the public. Currently this is only 
exposed through the rare adverse comment in a committee report, whereas in Australia 
statistics are available.145  
                                                          
139  Harry Evans and Rosemary Laing (eds) Odgers' Australian Senate practice (13th ed, Department of  
State, Canberra, 2012) at Chapter 19  <http://www.aph.gov.au/About_Parliament/Senate/Powers_ 
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140  Senate Order, above n 137, at s c(3) 
141  Government Guidelines for Official Witnesses, above n 92, at [21].  
142  At [11]. 
143  Guidelines, above n 23, at [32]. 
144  Lambert, above n 20, at 178.  
145  "Orders for production of documents not complied with" Commonwealth Parliament of Australia  
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Such a resolution could also note the ability to receive secret evidence as a mechanism to 
avoid harm to the public interest through open disclosure. While public participation in 
select committees is one of the strengths of our democracy, one cannot deny that there is 
some information which cannot be made public. Sensitive Government activity that 
concerns national security must still be scrutinised. Not all scrutiny has to be public in 
order to be effective. While trust (or lack thereof) of non-Government members may be a 
concern,146 the Office of the Clerk does have mechanisms in place to manage secret 
evidence, by keeping the material in their custody and collecting numbered copies of the 
documents to prevent leaks. If select committees are not seen as an effective place to 
receive sensitive evidence, such briefings might be pushed into the side-lines, excluding 
some committee members and moving the process further away from democratic 
accountability.  
However this is only part of the answer. There also needs to be a process to manage 
disagreement over where the public interest falls in a particular case.  
 
B  Process in case of disagreement  
What if national security concerns are said to prohibit disclosure, but the committee 
refuses to receive anything but the information in full? Recent events foreign affairs has 
raised this question in the Commonwealth Senate of Australia. In New South Wales 
(NSW) there is a process for independent arbitration of public interest immunity claims, 
which may serve as a model for breaking the stalemate between the Legislature and the 
Executive.  
The NSW Legislative Council, following a refusal to a summons for the provision of 
documents, suspended the responsible Minister from the House, resulting in that Minister 
challenging the powers of the Council in the courts.147 The information at issue was 
Government consent to a proposed goldmine and the environmental impact of the 
project.148 The subsequent decision in 1996 of Egan v Willis of the NSW Court of Appeal 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Statistics /Senate_StatsNet/documents/opds/ 
Orders_for_production_of_documents _not_complied_with>. 
146  Interview with Hon Trevor Mallard, above n 41.  
147  Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee, above n 133, at 3.  
148  Bannister, Appleby and Olijnyk Government Accountability: Australian Administrative Law  
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held that the Council had an inherent power to require the production of documents and 
impose sanctions in cases of non-compliance.149 While the basis of the powers of the 
NSW Parliament is different to that of New Zealand, the focus of the courts' reasoning 
was on the function rather than the foundation of the powers. The power to demand 
papers was characterised as an inherent power of the House which exists to the extent 
that it is reasonably necessary for the proper exercise of its functions.150 It was held that 
the Legislature had an imperative need for access to material in order to effectively 
consider both the introduction of new laws and the operation of current laws.151 The 
Court's reasoning shows that this power is crucial in enabling the Legislature to fulfil its 
constitutional function and is equally applicable to New Zealand.  
The question to be resolved by the NSW process is whether the information should enter 
the public domain.152  Where a claim is made, a description of the document is prepared 
along with reasons for the privilege claim. The documents are then delivered to the Clerk 
to be made available only to members of the Legislative Council.153 Any member may 
dispute the validity of the claim to privilege; the Clerk will then submit the document to 
an independent arbitrator, who submits an advisory report within one week.154  
The important issue of asylum-seekers recently forced the consideration of whether such 
a process is necessary in the Commonwealth Senate. In November 2013 the Senate 
ordered the production of all communications relating to recent "in water operations".155 
The documents were not disclosed due to national security risk.156 The Senate rejected 
this claim of public interest immunity and called again for the documents.157 The 
Minister defended the immunity claim.158 It was at this point that the Senate referred the 
matter for inquiry to the Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee. The 
Government did not produce any further information, although presentation could have 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2015) at 165. 
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been in camera or in an altered form. The committee was precluded from assessing the 
validity of the Government's national security concerns, concluding that the lack of 
cooperation only heightened their suspicions.159 The committee could only suggest the 
Senate follow political remedies such as it had done in the past.160 As Executive non-
compliance is an on-going obstacle to Senate effectiveness, the committee recommended 
consideration of reform. Their report proposed that the Senate Standing Committee on 
Procedure consider the process of independent arbitration adopted in NSW. On 6 March 
2014 the Senate adopted the recommendation. The inquiry is being considered at the time 
of writing. The Australian Senate Standing Committee on Finance and Public 
Administration considered a similar proposal in 2010, ultimately recommending against 
adoption of an independent arbitration model.161 The recommendation was based on a 
specific proposal, details of which served as a basis for criticism from the majority 
report.162 The inquiry currently underway has a broader terms of reference.163 
 
C Reform of the New Zealand Guidelines 
There is a lack of clarity in the Guidelines for official interacting with select committees. 
The principal fault is the lack of distinction drawn between fact-based and policy-based 
inquiries.164 The Guidelines relate exclusively to the latter without noting that these 
procedures may differ with the nature of the particular inquiry. It is true that, in general, 
officials who appear before select committee do so in support of Ministerial 
accountability.165 Committees will sometimes require a different type of evidence from 
the officials they request to appear before them. The Guidelines thus do not give an 
accurate description of the powers of select committees in relation to the Executive.  
The equivalent Australian document states that secrecy provisions only limit committees' 
powers if it applies to the House.166 An example of such a section is given.167 If there are 
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statutory restrictions on committees' inquiry powers contained in New Zealand 
legislation, they should be listed in the Guidelines. If none exist, then that paragraph 
should be removed from the document as it is misleading.168 
Also following the Australian document, the New Zealand Guidelines should be 
reformulated to take the parliamentary context into account. There may be greater public 
interest in providing information to a parliamentary inquiry than with other requests 
under freedom of information legislation.169 The ability to disclose the information 
confidentially also increases the scope of what can be released. These changes should 
also be reflected in the Cabinet Manual, which does not mention secret evidence.170 It is 
important that these documents accurately reflect the constitutional relationship.  
 
V Conclusion 
When it comes to accountability in foreign affairs, there is significant inconsistency 
between the technical powers of the House and actual practice. It does not appear that 
FADT is willing or able to fulfil its scrutiny function effectively.  
Statutory secrecy provisions restrict the inquiry powers of FADT. Evidence is regularly 
withheld during the Estimates process, which is meant to represent the highpoint of 
scrutiny. These limitations are not legally justified but remain unchallenged by the 
committee. The House has not clearly acknowledged any limitations to parliamentary 
privilege but practice shows that there are currently Government activities beyond 
scrutiny.  
Parliament and the Executive need to accommodate one another in their sometimes 
competing constitutional functions. If the House is prepared to limit its inquiry function 
to accommodate claims of public interest immunity, this should be clearly formulated so 
as to keep the restrictions within tight boundaries. If there are accepted grounds to justify 
non-disclosure, independent arbitration might need to follow, to resolve any 
disagreements as to the validity of claims. Mechanisms exist to allow scrutiny without 
compromising national security. Private and secret evidence need to be used more often 
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to ensure that there is no accountability vacuum. While there is a public interest in 
openness, there is a greater public interest in achieving effective scrutiny. Advice to 
officials must be clarified as the present ambiguity contained in the Guidelines does not 
facilitate inquiries.  
Political remedies are an unsatisfactory answer to a constitutional question of such 
significance. Adverse comments in committee reports and possible debate in the House 
was not the robust scrutiny envisaged by the 1985 reforms. Foreign affairs and defence 
policy is unique due to its prerogative basis and potential sensitivity. This may result in 
some differences to the Legislature’s scrutiny measures, but does not justify putting 
certain issues beyond the reach of inquiry. The idea that the level of investigation into 
foreign affairs is to be determined by the Government’s own political judgment171 is 
antithetical to democratic accountability. Parliament has a duty to scrutinise the 
Executive and must reform itself to enable the realisation of its constitutional function.  
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